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The Attempts at Legal Regulation of
Restitution in Poland in the Early Transition
Period: Main Dilemmas and Obstacles
BARBARA BŁASZCZYK*

It is an honor for me to take part in this important conference. As an
economist, I would like to emphasize the fact that I do not consider
myself a specialist in restitution, rather that title belongs to those in the
legal area. However, there was a period in my life when I worked very
closely with this issue.
In the early 1990s, at the beginning of Poland’s transition from a
socialist economy to a market economy, as an adviser to the Parliament,
I was active in both the field of research and in preparing the legal
framework for the privatization of our economy. At the time, a big part
of our economy was in the state’s hands.1 The first privatization law was
passed in July 1991,2 followed by a new law introduced in 1996. 3
Restitution, or as we called it, reprivatization (meaning the return of
nationalized properties to private hands), was one of the possible paths to
re-establish the private sector. Behind this very broad term of
reprivatization, we understood it to mean giving property back to its
former owners or to compensate their losses. More precisely,
reprivatization should include all of the situations in which property has
been acquired by the state without just compensation. 4
In the following paper, I will use reprivatization and restitution as
synonyms. Given the complexity of the issue, reprivatization, or
* Institute of Economics, Polish Academy of Sciences. Conference Presentation on June 27, 2017.
1. In 1988 the state sector produced 81.2% of GDP and the private sector (including
agriculture) only 18.8%. MACIEJ BAŁTOWSKI & KOZARZEWSKI PIOTR, ZMIANA
WŁASNOŚCIOWA POLSKIEJ GOSPODARKI 71 (2014).
2. Ustawa z dnia 13 lipca 1990 r. o prywatyzacji przedsiębiorstw państwowych [The Act of
13 July 1990 on the Privatization of State Enterprises] (1990 Dz. U. nr. 51 poz. 298) (Pol.).
3. Ustawa z dnia 30 sierpnia 1996 r. o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji [The Act of 30 August
1996 on Commercialization and Privatization] (1996 Dz. U. nr. 118 poz. 561) (Pol.).
4. TOMASZ LUTEREK, REPRYWATYZACJA. ŹRÓDŁA PROBLEMU 77 (2016).
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restitution, needed a special law beyond privatization law to solve the
problems connected with this subject in Poland.
I was asked by the organizers of this conference to speak about the
early restitution attempts in Poland because of my presence in the teams
that prepared opinions on similar issues during these times. From 1991 to
1996, I was the vice-president of the so-called Council of Ownership
Changes to the prime minister in Poland, Rada Przekształceń
Własnościowych. The Council, which was made up of nine experts, was
an advisory and consulting organ to the government and covered all
issues related to privatization. We prepared numerous opinions on the
different privatization procedures and their implementation, and among
others, we had the opportunity five times to submit our opinions on drafts
of reprivatization bills that were prepared during our tenure. We collected
all of our opinions and when the Council finished its activity in 1996, we
published them in one collective volume. 5 This volume should be
available at the Parliament Library.
The second institution I would like to mention in connection with
my expertise in restitution is CASE, the Centre of Social and Economic
Analysis, where I worked during the nineties. CASE is a think-tank,
active in the research and advisory area, and was established by a small
group of economists interested in transition issues. With this particular
organization, we managed to publish a number of books and papers on
the topics of post-communist transition and privatization in countries
from our region. In some of these publications,6 we made detailed
comparisons between the reprivatization bills in other post-communist
countries as compared to our drafts and analyzed their lessons for Poland.
The third body of work that I want to direct you to is a book written
by Dr. Tomasz Luterek, who is among us today. The book discusses the
background of Polish reprivatization and the sources of difficulties. 7 I was
one of the reviewers of this noteworthy publication and I strongly advise
you to read this very interesting interdisciplinary book, which attempts to
clarify the factors that hindered the enactment of the reprivatization law
until today.
5. Rada Przekształceń Własnościowych przy Prezesie Rady Ministrów (1996), Opinie,
stanowiska i oświadczenia przygotowane w latach 1991-1996.
6. Jerzy Baehr & Tomasz Kwieciński, Reprivatization in Post-Communist Countries, in
PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, vol. II, 67-92 (Blaszczyk B., and R.
Woodward eds., 1996), CASE; Jerzy Baehr & Tomasz Kwieciński, Polskie dylematy
reprywatyzacji: wybrane zagadnienia prawne, in PRYWATYZACJA W POLSCE I W
NIEMCZECH WSCHODNICH, 222-241 (Blaszczyk, B., Quaisser W. and R. Woodward eds.,
1997) CASE.
7. LUTEREK, supra note 4.
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I will now focus on the rationale for restitution in Poland as we have
seen it at the beginning of the transition in 1990, which I will try to
present in a systematic order.
First, the ethical considerations—after post-war massive
confiscations of private properties, we thought that restitution would be
morally justifiable, as at least partial compensation. In our view, the
properties should either be returned to those who were set to inherit or
were unjustifiably deprived of them, or those people should receive other
compensation.
The second consideration was of economic and systemic nature—
private property is a crucial element of any free market economy. We
needed to quickly broaden the private sector at the expense of the very
dominant state sector. In our view, restitution would help in this process,
leading to more private entities and to more private properties on the
market.
The third rationale was rooted in our understanding of the rule of
law. The respect for private property rights and protection against their
violation is one of the fundamental elements of state order, as is written
in the Constitution of Poland. 8 Unless such a right is strongly guaranteed,
people will be afraid that their property can be taken. In this regard, unless
the state would compensate the losses of its citizens stemming from
unlawful confiscations in a not so distant past, the credibility of the state
could be questioned.
The last consideration was pragmatic—in order to increase the pace
of privatization of state-owned enterprises that during former
confiscations often became owners of private land and other property, it
was very important to quickly clarify the property claims before starting
the privatization procedures. We thought that having an act on restitution
would help clarify and put in order the property rights.
These were the main arguments as to why we thought that restitution
was a matter of crucial importance in Poland. There were also many
counterarguments to it. One counterargument was related to the bad state
of the Polish economy in the 1980s and early 1990s. The public debt was
enormous and inflation was huge. The post-communist economy was a
disaster and the economy was in need of costly structural reforms. The
social costs of these reforms were predicted to be very high, and
restitution would cause additional costs. This is probably why the issue
of restitution was excluded from the first privatization law in 1991.

8. Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r. [Constitution of the
Republic of Poland of Apr. 2, 1997] art. 20, 21, & 64 (1997 Dz. U. no. 78 poz. 483) (Pol.).
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Another argument that was often raised in the public debate was that
the whole society took great material and physical losses during World
War II and the period immediately following. Why should only a portion
of the society (the former owners of property) be given the properties
back while the rest would be not compensated for their losses? Many
politicians thought in a similar way.
Doubts were also raised as to whether the land that was given to the
farmers during the land reform in 1945 would be taken back from the
farmers. Subsequently, it was stated by the authors of the restitution
projects that such an intention did not exist and the beneficiaries, the
target group of the agricultural reform, would not be obliged to give the
properties back.
Many other questions were raised. For instance, would a restitution
act not cause an avalanche of complaints and claims from persons who
would be excluded or not satisfied by the law? Would it not bring about
numerous abuses, malpractices, and corruption?
There have been numerous attempts directed at preparing the
reprivatization law. Altogether, there were about eighteen drafts of the
restitution law discussed. Some of the drafts came close to being passed,
but were never enacted. They differed from each other in many respects.
The most advanced of the drafts, from a technical point of view, was a
rather large-scale draft, but only concerned Warsaw properties. It was
proposed in 1999 by the government of Jerzy Buzek and was agreed upon
by the Parliament. 9 However, it was vetoed by President Aleksander
Kwaśniewski because, in his opinion, it was too high of a financial cost.
A similar draft was prepared again by the government of Donald Tusk
from 2008 to 2010,10 but was abandoned because of the global financial
crisis at this time.
Aside from the compensations awarded just after World War II to
foreigners (excluding German nationals) for their property left in Poland
that was nationalized under indemnification agreements, there were only
partial regulations implemented. These partial regulations include, for
example, the 2005 Restitution Act for Polish citizens who had lost their
properties from former eastern Polish provinces (now part of other
9. Rządowy projekt ustawy o reprywatyzacji nieruchomości i niektórych ruchomości osób
fizycznych przejętych przez Państwo lub gminę miasta stołecznego Warszawy oraz o
rekompensatach [Government Bill on the Reprivatization of Real Estate and some Movables of
Natural Persons Taken Over by the State or Municipality of the Capital City of Warsaw and on
Compensations] (1999 Dz. U. nr. 1360 poz. 20) (Pol.).
10. LUTEREK,
supra
note
4,
at
297-298;
http://www.msp.gov.pl/portal/pl/48/14834/Informacja_na_temat_prac_nad_projektem_ustawy_o
_ swiadczeniach_pienieznych_przyzn.html.
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countries) after World War II.11 Another example is the 1989 Restitution
Act for the Catholic Church and Other Religious Organizations. 12 There
was also an important government directive from 1993 to set up a special
restitution fund to accumulate reserves in order to fulfill future
reprivatization claims. In 2000, this directive was confirmed by the
Parliament in the amendment to the privatization law. 13 The
Reprivatization Fund is made up of contributions from former stateowned companies sold in public offers—5% of shares from each
privatized company. 14 However, a general restitution law that would
apply to all Polish citizens deprived in the communist period is still
missing.
I will now delve into the differences between consecutive restitution
drafts that have been discussed in the past by our government and
parliament. The first difference was in the proposed scope of restitution.
A very narrow proposal was to limit the object of restitution to the
property that had been confiscated by an over-inclusive interpretation of
the nationalization laws of 1945-1950. For instance, when smaller
properties were confiscated than the law prescribed, like small factories
employing less than 50 people, only then would compensation be due.
Implementing such a proposal would mean accepting the nationalization
laws and compensating only their mistakes. This would be unjust and
against the logic of reprivatization, which aims to compensate losses in a
fair way. In effect, all property that has been nationalized without
compensation should be included into the process.
Another question regarding scope was whether only the property
located in today’s existing borders of the country should be included in
the process of restitution or whether property nationalized in former
Polish regions, now belonging to other countries, should also be included.
This question was answered in the aforementioned law from July 2005—
deciding for a broader scope. There was also a question as to what kind
of real property should be the subject of restitution. Eventually, a broader
11. Ustawa z dnia 8 lipca 2005 r. o realizacji prawa do rekompensaty z tytułu pozostawienia
nieruchomości poza obecnymi granicami R.P. [The Act of 8 July 2005 on the Exercise of the Right
to Compensation for Leaving the Real Property Outside the Current Limits of R.P.] (2005 Dz. U.
nr 169 poz. 1418) (Pol.).
12. Ustawa z dnia 17 maja 1989 r. o stosunku do Kościoła katolickiego w rzeczpospolitej
polskiej [The Act of 17 May 1989 on the State’s Relationship with the Catholic Church in the
Republic of Poland] (1989 Dz. U. nr. 29 poz. 154) (Pol.).
13. Ustawa z dnia 29 marca 2000 r. o zmianie ustawy o komercjalizacji i prywatyzacji
przedsiębiorstw państwowych [The Act of 29 March 2000 Amending the Act on
Commercialization and Privatization of State Enterprises] (2000 Dz. U. nr. 31 poz. 383) (Pol.).
14. Fundusz Reprywatyzacji exists until now and had in January 2017 some 4,500,000,000
Polish zloty in its account.
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scope seemed more appropriate. The kinds of land included agricultural
land, forests, houses, etc.
The second difference between the drafts was in the choice of
beneficiaries of reprivatization, in other words, who had the right to apply
for the restitution. Should the beneficiaries be limited to Polish citizens?
Polish citizens now, or at the time of nationalization? What about
foreigners? Only former owners, or also their heirs? Individuals or
institutions? Discussed drafts differed very much in this regard. The most
popular view was that all deprived people had to be citizens of Poland at
the time of nationalization and their heirs should be included.
Another difference refers to the form of reimbursement of damage.
Not everything can be reimbursed “in kind” or given back in the very
same form in which it was taken. There was an idea to offer a
replacement, such as other property owned by the state treasury. At some
point it was suggested to offer restitution bonuses that would serve as
vouchers, as opposed to damages. These bonuses or vouchers were to be
exchanged for shares of state-owned companies that were being
privatized, parts of state-owned real estate, or for money. There was also
a discussion as to what form of reimbursement should have priority. It
seems that nowadays only two forms of reimbursement would be
accepted, in kind or monetary.
Other points of decision included whether compensation should be
partial or in full, paid immediately or installments over time, and whether
it should be digressive relative to the value of claims or subject to
taxation. There was also discussion as to the method of valuation of
properties claimed for restitution. Finally, the legal effects of such a
general restitution law on other laws was discussed, for example, whether
or not this law, once enacted, should block other legal ways of making
claims for nationalized properties that exist now.
It goes without saying that the drafts of the reprivatization law
discussed by the Polish Parliament and government differed in many
respects and compromise was difficult due to the various parties’
competing interests.
As mentioned previously, our Council of Ownership Changes took
a stance on all drafts of privatization discussed in the first half of 1990.
We were convinced that restitution needed very fast legal regulation
because of economic and social reasons, like the blocking of privatization
and the questioning of confidence in the new government, respectively.
We were of the opinion that the law should have broad scope and should
concern all types of confiscation, not merely those that were in conflict
with the communist law; all nationalization laws and decrees of 1945-
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1950 were illegal and unconstitutional. We thought that the scope of
reprivatization should include many different types of property and
should concern many types of beneficiaries, not limited to individuals and
current Polish citizens. We supported many kinds of reimbursement,
restitution in kind, when possible, and reprivatization bonuses that could
be exchanged for other state properties. We especially acknowledged the
need to determine the value of properties at the time of deprivation, not
the current market value, as well as the expenses undertaken by public
entities for the maintenance of the properties to date. Finally, we saw the
need when drafting this law to take into consideration the financial
limitations of the government, in terms of partial compensation,
digressive quotas and taxes. Upon reflection, I believe our opinions were
quite reasonable at the time, and many of the suggestions could be
sustained today, apart from the reprivatization bonuses.
The reprivatization law failed not for lack of ideas, but for lack of
solutions. Despite the fact that members of most political parties
supported the idea of reprivatization and many efforts have been made, it
has still not been resolved. I attempt to explain this lack of resolution in
the final section of my discussion.
The discussions began in the early 1990s. Initially, compromise was
difficult because of the extreme solutions for reprivatization proposed by
differing political forces. Former property owners, followed by some
right-wing parties, demanded full restitution in kind, while the left-wing
parties were in favor of a small or even symbolic scale and scope of
reprivatization. The constant turnover within the government and the
radical political change that followed each election, together with the lack
of continuity of work, posed the biggest hurdle to enacting a law. To a
large extent, politics dominated the law on reprivatization. Let’s look at
two examples for this thesis.
As mentioned above, the government of Hanna Suchocka passed a
directive about establishing a reprivatization reserve from shares of
privatized companies for future restitution claims in 1993. This directive
was accompanied by another decision blocking the state treasury from
selling real estate that was the object of private restitution claims.
According to estimations made at that time, 80% of those claims could
be satisfied in kind from those properties; but the next government of
Waldemar Pawlak, leader of the farmers party PSL, cancelled this second
directive in 1994. This political decision had very important
consequences for the future – it made restitution in kind impossible.
Subsequent projects treated this kind of restitution as more or less
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marginal and had to propose other solutions, such as compensation in
exchange for money or other real estate.
Another example was when President Kwaśniewski vetoed a wellprepared draft of the reprivatization bill discussed for many years by the
Buzek government and approved by the parliament in 2000.
Kwaśniewski said the bill was contrary to the rules of social justice,
against equal rights of citizens and harmful for the economy. Since then,
the climate for restitution has worsened due to a fear of the high social
and financial costs of broad scale compensations.
From 2008-2010, the Donald Tusk government discussed the next
draft of the reprivatization law; however, the presentation was never
made to the parliament because the government viewed the financial
costs of regulation as too high. It was typical for this and many other
governments to indefinitely adjourn important decisions that would be
costly for the state budget unless they were supported by a strong political
group of interest.
This brings us to another reason why the restitution law could not
be effective. Admittedly, there was a lack of broad societal support for
restitution. The social groups that suffered under confiscation are
relatively small, weak and not very influential in comparison to the part
of society that is not interested in or against reprivatization. All those who
benefited from the confiscation, for example those who have gained land
thanks to land reform or received flats given almost for free by the
government in the early socialist period, have not seen the need for any
corrections of this situation in favor of deprived former owners. Even if
they were not obliged to give anything back, they would not be ready to
bear together, with all other citizens, the indirect economic costs of
restitution that would come out of the state budget. Additionally, many
land owners were concerned that former owners would disturb them in
purchasing the land for a cheap price. Finally, the Catholic Church and
other religious organizations received compensation even before the
process of transition started.15 Consequently, the Church was no longer
interested in the fight for restitution on behalf of other citizens.
On the side of the authorities, even those that understood the moral
obligation and practical need for reprivatization, there was not enough
determination to resist the pressures of opponents and bring this process
to an end. It also seems as though there was not a sufficient educational

15. Ustawa z dnia 17 maja 1989 r. o stosunku państwa do kościoła katolickiego w
rzeczpospolitej polskiej [The Act of 17 May 1989 on the State’s Relationship with the Catholic
Church in the Republic of Poland] (1989 Dz.U. nr. 29 poz. 154) (Pol.).

FINAL TO JCI (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

Attempts at Legal Regulation of Restitution

12/12/2018 2:33 AM

367

effort to explain to the people the rationale for reprivatization and to
convince them of its necessity.
There was a lack of consideration as to the costs of such decisions
for future generations and later governments. These costs appeared very
quickly. Because no reprivatization law exists to settle restitution issues,
affected parties must turn to an alternative course to seek compensation
by way of damages through individual court procedures and subsequent
administrative decisions. However, the courts are not well prepared for
such procedures; for example, there is a lack of proper technical rules on
valuation of the claimed property. Instead of using the value at the
moment of nationalization, often times the present value is used. As a
result, there has been no consistency and there have been many defective
court and administrative decisions.
What is more, without detailed legal regulation of this issue a great
loophole was established. Numerous law offices and other middlemen
decided to make their business from the unresolved restitution cases in
Poland. Some of them cheat the heirs of former owners by acquiring their
property claims for low amounts, and after receiving positive decisions
from the court, selling the same property for very large sums. Also, in the
last few years, a strong criticism of new owners of houses appeared.
These new owners received the properties back on the basis of their own
restitution claims or on claims acquired from the families of former
owners. They also misused their ownership rights in persecuting the
inhabitants of these houses in order to force them out.
On the other hand, the financial situation became increasingly
dangerous for the state and local budgets. The amount of money that has
to be paid out for reprivatization is growing each year and more resources
will need to be set aside for the growing number of property restitution
claims. The scale of these public expenditures together with the
unresolved restitution issue will probably convince the government that
it is time to not only resume the discussion on reprivatization, but to bring
this issue to a close. Recently, we have been informed that the
government is working on a new draft of reprivatization and that there is
a political will to implement it quickly.
Let us hope that this law will be based on sound principles, taking
into account not only the needs of the authorities, but also the interests of
former owners as well as today’s societal groups. Let us also hope for this
law to be in line with moral standards and the rule of law.

